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I. INTRODUCTION 
Where it applies, defamation law’s presumed damages rule 
permits a defamed plaintiff to recover damages for injury to 
reputation and attendant mental suffering without proof of actual 
harm. Despite heavy criticism, the presumed damages rule has had 
remarkable staying power in American law. The rule is subject to 
First Amendment limitations in cases involving public officials,1 
figures,2 and issues,3 but in the vast number of cases where there 
are no limiting First Amendment interests, the presumed damages 
rule continues to apply in many jurisdictions. 
 
        †   Margaret H. and James E. Kelley Professor of Tort Law, William Mitchell 
College of Law. Thanks to Rob Yount and Chris Kinniburgh for their research 
assistance in the preparation of this article. 
 1.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 283–84 (1964). 
 2.  Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967). 
 3.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
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The rule has been criticized for a variety of reasons.4 
Rejections or limitations of the rule turn on the inconsistent and 
generally unconstrained damages awards fostered by the rule, the 
unjustified distinctions in the categories of defamation claims that 
support presumed damages awards and those that do not, and the 
incompatibility of presumed damages with a tort regime that 
generally awards damages only for actual harm.5 
The continued acceptance of the rule, on the other hand, 
turns on judicial perceptions of the importance of vindicating 
reputational interests, the difficulty in proving actual injury to 
reputation, and concerns that reputational interests will be 
insufficiently protected by an actual damages rule.6 
The rule was tested to its limits in Longbehn v. City of Moose 
Lake7 and Longbehn v. Schoenrock.8 The four trials and three appeals 
to the court of appeals spanning eleven years in a case that arose 
out of a single defamatory phone call to one person highlight the 
problems created by the presumed damages rule in defamation 
cases. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the presumed 
damages rule as it has functioned, ultimately using Longbehn as a 
laboratory for evaluating the criticisms of the rule. 
The article proceeds in seven parts. The first part frames the 
ongoing debate over the viability of the presumed damages rule 
through a brief examination of three recent state supreme court 
decisions: Smith v. Durden,9 a New Mexico Supreme Court decision 
rejecting the rule of presumed damages in favor of one requiring 
proof of actual harm to reputation in all defamation cases; W.J.A. v. 
D.A.,10 a New Jersey Supreme Court case in which the court 
 
 4.  For a comprehensive criticism of the rule see David A. Anderson, 
Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1983). See also 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1996) (arguing harm cannot be based on “language used 
alone”); Julie C. Sipe, “Old Stinking, Old Nasty, Old Itchy Old Toad”: Defamation Law, 
Warts and All (A Call for Reform), 41 IND. L. REV. 137, 152–59 (2008).  
 5.  See discussion infra Part I. 
 6.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 7.  Longbehn v. City of Moose Lake, No. A04-1214, 2005 WL 1153625, 
at *10–11 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 2005). 
 8.  Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. A09-2141, 2010 WL 3000283, at *3–4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010); Longbehn v. Schoenrock, 727 N.W.2d 153, 161 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 9.  276 P.3d 943 (N.M. 2012). 
 10.  43 A.3d 1148 (N.J. 2012). 
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retained the rule but limited it to nominal damages; and Bierman v. 
Weier,11 an Iowa Supreme Court case in which the court retained 
the presumed damages rule. Together, the cases highlight the 
considerations courts have typically deemed relevant in 
determining whether the rule should be rejected, retained, or 
modified. 
Because some of the criticisms of the rule focus on the lack of 
guidelines for juries to follow in awarding damages, part two 
surveys pattern jury instructions on presumed damages in order to 
garner a sense of how presumed damages issues are actually 
submitted to juries. Part three focuses on Minnesota’s experience 
with the presumed damages rule in light of the concerns with the 
rule that were raised in Bierman, W.J.A., and Durden. It includes a 
basic discussion of Minnesota defamation law involving presumed 
damages, a short survey of Minnesota defamation cases over the 
past twenty years, and Minnesota’s treatment of excessive damages 
claims in defamation cases in order to provide a more detailed 
perspective on the argument that presumed damages awards are 
not subject to reasonable judicial restraints. Part four summarizes 
the discussion of presumed damages law. Part five focuses on the 
Longbehn series of cases against the backdrop of Minnesota 
presumed damages case law. Part six discusses the lessons learned 
from the Longbehn series of cases. Part seven is the conclusion. 
II. FRAMING THE DEBATE 
The Supreme Court of the United States has limited the right 
to recover presumed damages in defamation suits by public 
officials, public figures, and private persons involved in public 
issues to cases where they prove actual malice.12 While that leaves 
the states substantial latitude in deciding whether to retain, modify, 
or eliminate the presumed damages rule in cases where there are 
no First Amendment limitations, the Supreme Court’s discussions 
of the presumed damages rule in defamation decisions bookend 
state supreme court discussions of the criticisms and attributes of 
the rule. 
 
 11.  826 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 2013). 
 12.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); Curtis 
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 283–84 (1964). 
3
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In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court saw common law 
defamation as an “oddity of tort law” because of its presumed 
damages rule, which leads to “[t]he largely uncontrolled discretion 
of juries to award damages where there is no loss,” and “invites 
juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact,” 
consequences that “inhibit the vigorous exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms.”13 And “[m]ore to the point,” the Court 
added, “the States have no substantial interest in securing for 
plaintiffs such as [Gertz] gratuitous awards of money damages far 
in excess of any actual injury.”14 
In a private plaintiff case, a plurality of the Court in Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., noted that “[t]he rationale 
of the common-law rules has been the experience and judgment of 
history that ‘proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great 
many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words and 
the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious 
harm has resulted in fact,’” and that as a consequence, “courts for 
centuries have allowed juries to presume that some damage 
occurred from many defamatory utterances and publications.”15 
Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet highlight two of the important 
factors in the policy debate over presumed damages. There are 
others, including the purpose of defamation law, and whether it 
should encompass more than just protection of reputational 
interests; the inconsistent outcomes the presumed damages rule 
promotes; and the inability of courts to impose meaningful limits 
on jury awards of presumed damages because of the inherent lack 
of guidelines in the rule. 
The next three recent cases illustrate three different 
approaches to the rule by courts considering the same basic policy 
issues. 
 
 13.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 
(1985) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 
(4th ed. 1971)).  
4
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A. Smith v. Durden 
Smith v. Durden,16 a recent New Mexico Supreme Court 
decision rejecting the presumed damages rule in defamation cases, 
caps a significant reworking of New Mexico defamation law over 
the past few years. Durden is one of the more detailed judicial 
examinations of the presumed damages rule. 
The plaintiff, an Episcopal priest, brought suit against various 
defendants following the publication of certain documents 
accusing him of sexual misconduct with minor parishioners.17 The 
key issue in the case was whether proof of actual injury to 
reputation should be required in all New Mexico defamation cases. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that actual injury to 
reputation is a predicate to recovery in a defamation case.18 
In prior decisions the court had simplified New Mexico 
defamation law and made the rules governing defamation more 
uniform. In Marchiondo v. Brown, a post-Gertz case involving a 
private defamation plaintiff, the court held that strict liability no 
longer applies in defamation cases; that the “ordinary common law 
negligence standard of proof” applies to private defamation 
plaintiffs, and recovery is limited to actual damages; that private 
defamation plaintiffs seeking special damages must plead and 
prove them; and that a private defamation plaintiff seeking 
punitive damages has to prove actual malice.19 Later, in Newberry v. 
Allied Stores, Inc.,20 the supreme court eliminated the distinctions 
between defamation per se and defamation per quod.21 
 
 16.  276 P.3d 943 (N.M. 2012). 
 17.  Id. at 944. 
 18.  Id. at 951. 
 19.  Marchiondo v. Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 470–71 (N.M. 1982). 
 20.  773 P.2d 1231 (N.M. 1989). 
 21.  Id. at 1236. Previously, under New Mexico law: 
A statement is deemed to be defamatory per se, if, without reference to 
extrinsic evidence and viewed in its plain and obvious meaning, the 
statement imputes to plaintiff: the commission of some criminal 
offense involving moral turpitude; affliction with some loathesome 
[sic] disease, which would tend to exclude the person from society; 
unfitness to perform duties of office or employment for profit, or the 
want of integrity in discharge of the duties of such office or 
employment; some falsity which prejudices plaintiff in his or her 
profession or trade; or unchastity of a woman. Any other 
communication, though not defamatory on its face, but which 
5
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Once a court removes the distinctions between libel per se and 
libel per quod and jettisons the rule permitting recovery for 
presumed damages on a showing of slander per se or special 
damages, the choice is simple. Either presumed damages will be 
awarded in all defamation cases or plaintiffs will have to prove 
actual injury to reputation in all cases. There is no middle ground. 
That was the situation in Durden. 
The court concluded that because the essential purpose of 
defamation law is to provide redress for injury to reputation, no 
recovery should be allowed absent actual injury to reputation.22 The 
court acknowledged that there will be costs because of its decision, 
primarily because proof of actual damage will be impossible in a 
great number of cases.23 Because the interest of defamation law is 
providing compensation to individuals for injury to reputation, 
however, allowing “[r]ecovery for a mere tendency to injure 
reputation, or only upon a showing of mental anguish,” is both too 
speculative and an inappropriate blend of “defamation, a tort 
properly limited by constitutional protections, with other causes of 
action.”24 
 
becomes defamatory when its meaning is illuminated by proof of 
extrinsic facts is actionable per quod. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 22.  Durden, 276 P.3d at 948–49. Recovery for emotional harm is disallowed, 
absent injury to reputation, a result reached by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. 1996), but the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding is limited to cases involving private persons 
involved in public issues who sue media defendants. See infra notes 77–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 23.  Durden, 276 P.3d at 952 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985)). The full quote from Dun & Bradstreet 
reads as follows: 
The rationale of the common-law rules has been the experience and 
judgment of history that “proof of actual damage will be impossible in 
a great many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words 
and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious 
harm has resulted in fact.”  
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 15, § 112, at 765). 
 24.  Durden, 276 P.3d at 952. 
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B. W.J.A. v. D.A. 
W.J.A. v. D.A.,25 is a New Jersey Supreme Court defamation 
case arising out of an Internet posting on the defendant’s website 
claiming that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted him when he was a 
minor.26 One of the issues in the case was whether the doctrine of 
presumed damages had continued vitality in a defamation case 
involving a private citizen and a matter of private concern. The 
court initially noted the scholarly criticisms of the rule, and that 
some jurisdictions have abolished presumed damages in favor of a 
rule that requires proof of actual damages in all cases, but that a 
majority of the states retain the doctrine in some form.27 The court 
saw the retention of the rule in those jurisdictions as a reflection of 
the underlying rationale for the presumed damages rule, which is 
“the belief that damage to reputation logically flows from 
defamation.”28 
The court perceived two primary criticisms of the rule. The 
first is “that the emphasis of modern tort law is injury and that 
where there is no injury, tort law should not provide a remedy,” 
and the second, “that there is no uniform way for a jury to value 
presumed damages.”29 
The court disagreed with the first criticism. Aside from 
compensation, the court viewed deterrence as an important part of 
tort law and vindication of reputation as an important interest 
advanced by defamation law. A trial, the court thought, establishes 
the falsity of the defamatory statement even if only nominal 
damages are awarded.30 The court cited Justice O’Hern’s dissent in 
Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire Macdonald-Cartier31 to emphasize its point 
that “out-of-pocket losses are not the only damages a private 
plaintiff in a defamation act suffers.”32 Those “damages include the 
 
 25.  43 A.3d 1148 (N.J. 2012). 
 26.  Id. at 1151. 
 27.  Id. at 1154–55, 1159. 
 28.  Id. at 1158. 
 29.  Id. at 1158–59 (citing Anderson, supra note 4, at 747–50). 
 30.  W.J.A., 43 A.3d at 1159. The court saw presumed damages operating “as a 
procedural device which relieves a plaintiff from proving specific damages,” rather 
than a conclusion that no damages occurred. Id. 
 31.  755 A.2d 583 (N.J. 2000). 
 32.  W.J.A., 43 A.3d at 1159 (citing Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire Macdonald-
Cartier, 755 A.2d 583, 591 (N.J. 2000) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974))). 
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loss of one’s good name inflicted by the defamatory publication to 
third parties, and the anguish and humiliation that flows from a 
communication that, history and experience teach, will diminish 
one’s good name.”33 
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the presumed 
damages rule has continuing validity: 
In today’s world, one’s good name can too easily be 
harmed through publication of false and defaming 
statements on the Internet. Indeed, for a private person 
defamed through the modern means of the Internet, 
proof of compensatory damages respecting loss of 
reputation can be difficult if not well-nigh insur-
mountable. We question why New Jersey’s longstanding 
common law tradition of presumed damages—for 
defamation claims by private citizens on matters that do 
not involve public concern—should be altered now to 
force an average citizen to ferret out proof of loss of 
reputation from any of the world-wide potential viewers of 
the defamatory Internet transmission about that otherwise 
private person. We are not persuaded that the common 
law of this state need change to require such victims to 
demonstrate compensatory losses in order to proceed 
with a cause of action.34 
Given the importance of presumed damages in vindicating 
“the dignitary and peace-of-mind interest in one’s reputation that 
may be impaired through the misuse of the Internet,” the court 
concluded that presumed damages for injury to reputation “serves 
a legitimate interest, one that ought not be jettisoned from our 
common law.”35 
The court retained the rule of presumed damages, but also 
concluded that the second criticism, the lack of guidelines for jury 
evaluation of presumed damages, was a fair criticism of the rule. 
This criticism did not require rejection of the presumed damages 
rule, but did justify limiting the presumed damages rule to nominal 
damages at trial, a result that avoids the problem of unprincipled 
damages awards. The court held that a plaintiff seeking to recover 
compensatory damages for reputational loss has “to prove actual 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 1159–60. 
 35.  Id. at 1160. 
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harm, pecuniary or otherwise, to his reputation through the 
production of evidence.”36 
C. Bierman v. Weier 
In Bierman v. Weier, the Iowa Supreme Court held that its 
settled rule of libel per se remained, as a matter of policy, “a useful 
rule in an area where it is often difficult . . . to prove actual 
damages,” particularly in cases involving a private plaintiff and non-
media defendant where no issue of public concern is involved.37 
The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet 
in support: 
The rationale of the common-law rules has been the 
experience and judgment of history that proof of actual 
damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, 
from the character of the defamatory words and the 
circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that 
serious harm has resulted in fact. . . . As a result, courts for 
centuries have allowed juries to presume that some 
damage occurred from many defamatory utterances and 
publications.38 
The Iowa Supreme Court perceived the difficulties in proving 
injury to reputation as due in part to the “subtle differences in the 
conduct of the recipients toward the plaintiff” and in part “because 
the recipients, the only witnesses able to establish the necessary 
causal connection, may be reluctant to testify that the publication 
affected their relationships with the plaintiff.”39 The court saw the 
proof problems as necessitating certain presumptions to ensure 
that the plaintiff receives adequate compensation, one of which is 
presumed damages.40 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 454–55 (Iowa 2013).  
 38.  Id. at 454 (alteration in original) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1985)). 
 39.  Id. (quoting Note, Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 875, 891–92 (1956)). 
 40.  Id. The court’s authority for that proposition is an extensive 1956 law 
review note on defamation that further qualifies the presumed damages concept: 
The present distinction between libel and slander, and that between 
actions per se and per quod, do not, however, provide a sound basis for 
applying presumptions of harm. The application of such presumptions 
should depend upon the potentiality of harm to the particular plaintiff 
from the publication in question rather than upon the form in which 
9
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The defendants in the case argued that the Internet has made 
libel per se obsolete because of the ability of targets of defamation 
to quickly respond to defamatory statements at a minimal cost.41 
But the court was not persuaded “that the Internet’s ability to 
restore reputations matches its ability to destroy them,”42 noting the 
concerns voiced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in W.J.A. v. D.A. 
over the ease of Internet defamation and the virtual impossibility of 
proving actual damages in those cases.43 The Iowa Supreme Court 
thought that the Internet, rather than a means of ready vindication 
of reputation, actually facilitates the publication of defamatory 
publications, and that “[p]resumed damages vindicate the dignitary 
and peace-of-mind interest in one’s reputation that may be 
 
the idea is communicated or upon the classification of certain ideas as 
inherently more harmful than others. Thus where there was no pre-
existing relationship between the recipients and the plaintiff which 
might be affected by an injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, nor any 
likelihood of such a future relationship, it is doubtful that any harm 
will result from the injury to reputation and none should be presumed. 
For example, if the only recipient was the defendant’s stenographer 
who had no likelihood of contact with the plaintiff, there should be no 
recovery unless the defamation was intentional. When, however, the 
plaintiff can show an existing or prospective relationship with 
recipients in whose eyes he has been injured, resulting harm is likely 
and should be presumed. 
   It may at times be appropriate to presume the necessary 
relationships as well as to presume that resulting harm has occurred. 
Where an idea which would injure the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes 
of most of the community is widely disseminated in the area in which 
the plaintiff is known, it may be impossible for him to produce 
evidence of specific relationships which he claims have been injured. 
In this case, the existence of such relationships should itself be 
presumed, since it is likely that there will be publications to many of 
those who have or will have contacts with the plaintiff. But where the 
idea, although widely communicated, would injure the plaintiff in the 
eyes of only a few recipients, the plaintiff should be required to prove 
that the necessary relationships existed between those recipients and 
himself. The presumption that harm has resulted to the plaintiff from 
the injury to his reputation should be rebuttable, but only when the 
harm is attributable to specific relationships. If the publication of a 
generally defamatory idea has been widespread it would be impossible 
to prove that there has been no resulting harm. 
Note, supra note 39, at 892 (citations omitted). 
 41.  Bierman, 826 N.W.2d at 454. 
 42.  Id. (quoting W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1159–60 (N.J. 2012)). 
 43.  Id. (quoting W.J.A., 43 A.3d at 1159–60). 
10
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impaired through the misuse of the Internet.”44 The court held that 
the presumption of damages in a defamation action arising in the 
Internet context should not be excised from Iowa common law,45 
but deviated from W.J.A. in allowing the presumed damages rule to 
operate in full, rather than confining it to nominal damages.46 
Courts do not disagree about the importance of protecting 
reputational interests, but they do disagree about the degree to 
which countervailing interests should limit the right to recover for 
injury to reputation. Rejection of the presumed damages rule 
carries with it certain costs, as the New Mexico Supreme Court 
noted in Durden, but it is impossible to measure those costs, aside 
from pointing to the obvious results in cases where plaintiffs are 
unable to establish actual injury to reputation, including in Durden 
itself. 
Other factors, including concern over the lack of guidelines 
for juries in assessing damages under the presumed damages rule, 
and, arguably, the resultant lack of uniformity in jury awards and 
judicial review of those awards, may be easier to evaluate. The next 
section surveys pattern presumed damages jury instructions to 
determine the degree of guidance they provide. 
III. PRESUMED DAMAGES JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Presumed damages jury instructions explain the rule in various 
ways. The most common approach is to state the basic rule without 
amplification. The instruction may state that “the law presumes 
damage to the plaintiff’s reputation, without special proof, and you 
may award the plaintiff such sum of compensatory damages as 
would in your discretion reasonably compensate the plaintiff for 
damage to the plaintiff’s reputation,”47 or that “damages are 
 
 44.  Id. On the ease of transmitting harmful information and the difficulty in 
rebutting it, see Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 91–106 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
 45.  Bierman, 826 N.W.2d at 454. 
 46.  See id. at 454 n.7. 
 47.  1 ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 23.18 (3d ed. 2013), 
available at Westlaw APJI (Compensatory Damages: Presumed (Slander Per Se)). 
The use note states that the instruction should be given only when the district 
court has determined “as a matter of law, (1) that the plaintiff is a private figure 
for purposes of the statement that is complained of, (2) that the publication that is 
complained of was a matter of purely private concern, and (3) that the statement 
11
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presumed and” the plaintiff “is not required to prove any 
damages,”48 but the instructions are clear in leaving damages to a 
jury’s discretion without requiring proof of actual damages. 
Other jury instructions are broader in including damages for 
mental suffering in the presumed damages charge. The California 
Judicial Council jury instruction covers harm to reputation in 
addition to mental suffering. Titled “Assumed Damages,” it states 
that even if the plaintiff “has not proved any actual damages for 
harm to reputation or shame, mortification or hurt feelings, the 
law assumes that [the plaintiff] has suffered this harm,” and that 
the plaintiff “is entitled to receive compensation for this assumed 
harm in whatever sum you believe is reasonable,” “[w]ithout 
presenting evidence of damage.”49 
 
complained of is slanderous per se.” Section 23.17 is to the same effect. Id. § 23.17 
(Compensatory Damages: Presumed (Libel Per Se)). The use note explains, 
probably unnecessarily, the legal reasons for the presumed damages rule: 
   Because the plaintiff is a private figure for purposes of this libel 
action, and the publication that is complained of was a matter of purely 
private concern, you may award presumed damages to the plaintiff if 
you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant 
negligently or intentionally published false and defamatory matter 
concerning the plaintiff.  
Id. 
 48.  REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL), Defamation 8 (5th ed. 2013), 
available at http://www.azbar.org/media/700258/defamation_2013.pdf. Idaho’s 
pattern instruction provides that “[t]he plaintiff is deemed to have been injured 
by the defamation in this case, and the plaintiff need not prove actual injury in 
order to recover damages.” IDAHO CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.84 (2003), available 
at http://www.isc.idaho.gov/problem-solving/civil-jury-instructions (Libel or Slander 
Per Se—Presumed Damages). Similarly, Maryland’s pattern instruction provides 
that “[w]hen a person is the subject of a defamatory statement that was made with 
actual malice there is a presumption that the statement causes that person harm, 
and relief may be awarded even in the absence of any evidence of actual damages.” 
MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 12:7 (2013 ed.), available at Westlaw 
MPJI. 
 49.  JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 1704 (2013), 
available at Westlaw CACI. The last bracketed paragraph of the instructions states 
that “[y]ou may in the exercise of your discretion award nominal damages only, 
namely an insignificant sum such as one dollar.” Id. California’s bar association 
jury instructions on presumed general damages provides that: 
   Presumed damages are those damages that necessarily result from 
the publication of defamatory matter and are presumed to exist. They 
include, but are not limited to, reasonable compensation for loss of 
personal [or professional] reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt 
12
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Virginia’s instruction is to the same effect in stating that the 
words the defendant published “were defamatory as a matter of 
law, that is, they were defamatory from their very nature without 
further proof thereof,” and that if the jury should find “from the 
evidence and the other instructions of the court” in favor of the 
plaintiff, “then damages for injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, and 
for humiliation and embarrassment are presumed without further 
proof thereof.”50 
Sometimes the jury instructions include a causation 
requirement. Ohio’s pattern instruction states that on a finding in 
favor of the plaintiff, the jury “may award the plaintiff an amount of 
money that you decide is reasonable and fair for the plaintiff’s 
(injury) (injuries) directly caused by (describe defamatory 
statement).”51 New York’s pattern instruction tells the jury that it may 
award an amount that, in the jury’s exercise of its “good judgment 
and common sense,” it decides “is fair and just compensation for 
the injury to plaintiff’s reputation and the humiliation and mental 
anguish in (his, her) public and private life which you decide was 
caused by defendant’s statement.”52 
The jury instructions may provide guidelines for a jury to 
consider in awarding presumed damages. The New York pattern 
instruction states that in determining the amount of damages, the 
jury “should consider the plaintiff’s standing in the community, 
the nature of defendant’s statement made about the plaintiff, the 
extent to which the statement was circulated, the tendency of the 
statement to injure a person such as the plaintiff, and all of the 
other facts and circumstances in the case.”53 
There are a few points to be made about the jury instructions. 
The obvious one is that instructions on presumed damages cannot 
 
feelings. No definite standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed 
by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for presumed 
damages, and no evidence of actual harm is required. Nor is the 
opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such reasonable 
compensation. In making an award for presumed damages you shall 
exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the 
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable. 
CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.10.1 (2013), available at Westlaw BAJI. 
 50.  RONALD J. BACIGAL & JOSEPH S. TATE, VIRGINIA PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 48:13 (2013–2014 ed.). 
 51.  1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 431.07(1)(A) (2014). 
 52.  NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil 3:29 (2013).  
 53.  Id. 
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be framed in terms of actual damages, and they should not include 
a requirement of a causal connection between the defamatory 
statement or statements and the plaintiff’s injuries. If injury to 
reputation and emotional harm is presumed, causation also has to 
be presumed. It also seems obvious that cluttering a jury instruction 
with unnecessary explanations of the law should be avoided in the 
interests of streamlining the instructions and making them more 
comprehensible to a jury. 
Instructing a jury on factors it may consider may be a 
reasonable way of providing context for a jury’s consideration of 
presumed damages. Providing general guidelines to assist a jury in 
assessing damages may also respond to the criticism that lack of 
guidelines creates the likelihood that a jury will take advantage of 
the occasion to punish a defendant, rather than award damages for 
presumed injury to reputation or emotional suffering. Ultimately, 
however, jury instructions that are faithful to the presumed 
damages rule can do no more than explain to the jury that 
damages may be awarded without proof of actual damages and 
provide general guidelines in confining the jury’s inquiry to the 
damages that would be presumed to arise from the specific 
defamatory statement or statements in issue in the case. 
IV. PRESUMED DAMAGES IN MINNESOTA 
The first part of this section provides a brief background of 
Minnesota’s view of presumed damages. The second part reviews 
defamation cases from the past twenty years to develop a broader 
picture of how defamation claims fare in Minnesota. The third part 
surveys Minnesota defamation cases involving claims that damages 
were excessive. 
A. Minnesota Defamation Law—the Basics 
Minnesota courts have consistently held that damages are 
presumed in libel cases and slander cases where the defamatory 
communication is slanderous per se or where the plaintiff proves 
special damages.54 The courts also repeatedly use the term 
 
 54.  Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 
1987) (rejecting the argument that the court “should abolish the rule that where 
defendant commits libel per se, general and punitive damages are recoverable 
without proof of actual damages”); Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. 
Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 1984) (“Courts at common law presumed damages 
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“defamatory per se” to refer to cases where damages are presumed 
if they fall within one of the categories of slander per se, 
irrespective of whether the statement is slander or libel.55 That may 
actually obscure the impact of the presumed damages rule by 
making it appear that presumed damages may be awarded only if 
the defamatory communication falls within one of the slander per 
se categories, irrespective of whether the claim is for libel or 
slander. The Minnesota Supreme Court could take that position, 
although it has not clearly done so. That leaves all libels subject to 
the presumed damages rule, along with slander that falls within 
one of the per se categories. 
The right to recover presumed damages is also subject to the 
First Amendment limitations established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,56 Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts,57 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,58 which preclude presumed 
damages in cases involving public officials, figures, and issues, 
unless the plaintiff is able to prove “actual malice.”59 If private 
plaintiffs involved in public issues are unable to prove actual 
 
from any libel.”); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 
1980) (stating that general damages are presumed in cases involving slander per 
se where the defamation is of one’s business reputation); West v. Hanrahan, 
28 Minn. 385, 385–86, 10 N.W. 415, 415 (1881) (slander per se). In the Advanced 
Training case the court stated that: 
Perhaps the clearest statement of Minnesota’s common law position is 
the statement of Justice Mitchell in Byram v. Aikin, 65 Minn. 87, 67 
N.W. 807 (1896): 
Written publications calculated to expose one to public contempt 
or ridicule, and thus induce an ill opinion of him, and impair him 
in the good opinion and respect of others, are libelous although 
they involve no imputation of crime, and are actionable without 
any allegation of special damages. 
352 N.W.2d at 9. 
 55.  For a more detailed examination of the “defamation per se” problem 
and how it arose, see Mike Steenson, Defamation Per Se: Defamation by Mistake?, 
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 779, 791–96 (2000). 
 56.  376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964). 
 57.  388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967). 
 58.  418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). 
 59.  “Actual malice” in this context means publishing with knowledge of the 
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. In 
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court stated that the 
recklessness standard requires “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that 
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”  
15
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malice, they are required to prove fault and actual damages,60 but if 
no public issue is involved, states are free to apply the presumed 
damages rule.61 
In Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Minnesota Supreme 
Court imposed a requirement that Gertz did not in requiring actual 
injury to reputation as a predicate to recovery of damages for 
emotional harm in a case involving private defamation plaintiffs 
involved in a matter of public concern who brought suit against a 
media defendant.62 Richie did not deal directly with the presumed 
damages rule in Minnesota, but it is an important case for the outer 
boundaries it imposed on defamation claims and because its 
analysis of the importance of vindicating reputational interests in 
defamation law would be a key in any argument that the presumed 
damages rule should be modified or eliminated in Minnesota. 
The case arose in the context of a discussion of sexual abuse 
on a nationally syndicated television program.63 During the 
program a photograph of the plaintiffs along with Denise Richie in 
a graduation gown was shown.64 Denise Richie discussed sexual 
abuse by her father during the program, but the adults in the 
picture were not Denise Richie’s parents.65 Rather, the picture was 
of Denise Richie standing with James Richie and Karen Gerten, 
who were her godparents.66 James Richie and Gerten brought suit 
against various defendants, alleging defamation and false light 
invasion of privacy.67 
Gerten and Richie were not aware that their picture was on the 
show until a later time.68 When they viewed the tape they were 
 
 60.  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. 
 61.  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 
(1985). 
 62.  Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 26 (Minn. 1996). 
 63.  Id. at 23. 
 64.  Id. at 24. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted three branches of the tort of 
invasion of privacy (intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of 
private facts) in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). 
The court declined to recognize the tort of false light publicity. Id. Justice 
Tomljanovich, the author of the opinion in Richie, dissented. Id. at 236 
(Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). 
 68.  Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 24. 
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distressed,69 but they both “testified that they will never know 
whether people saw the broadcast or think ill of them because of 
it.”70 The district court concluded that neither plaintiff lost income 
or incurred any special damage as a result of the broadcast and that 
the plaintiffs were unable as a matter of law to establish injury to 
their reputations.71 
The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on both claims.72 The court of appeals reversed, based 
in part on its conclusion that the district court erred in concluding 
that the plaintiffs were unable to establish injury to their 
reputations as a matter of law.73 The court of appeals recognized 
 
 69.  Id. The supreme court’s opinion highlighted the plaintiffs’ claims for 
emotional distress: 
Richie stated that he was “shocked,” “humiliated,” “blown away,” and 
felt “just crushed” and “very sick” about the broadcast. Richie also 
testified that: 
I don’t take this lightly. I put up with sexual abuse when I was a 
child in my home. My father sexually abused my sister . . . . The 
whole thing was so distasteful for me, you know, and—I don’t want 
to go back and live my childhood over again for anything. When I 
left the house and I started doing my own life and being a 
different person, then, you know, that was a great thing to me. 
And now how many years later, all of a sudden now Denny 
commits these crimes and through someone’s careless mistake or 
some bunch of people’s careless mistake, you know, all of a 
sudden now I’m thrust back into a situation, you know. That has 
caused me a great deal of emotional pain since I was a child . . . 
it . . . affect[s] me a lot and I . . . think about it every day. 
Gerten also testified concerning how the broadcast affected her: 
[I was] embarrassed by having that shown, that I was the mother of 
someone who was sexually molested by her dad and that I thought 
it was okay. When I thought about it, I would get sick to my 
stomach and—emotionally, it was very upsetting . . . . 
     [W]hen people would look at you, you would wonder if they 
saw the show, you know, are they staring at me because they saw 
the show . . . . It was always on my mind. It was upsetting and 
embarrassing. You’re already ashamed that it’s even been involved 
in your family and then you’re portrayed as the one who 
condoned it. I guess I have to say that emotionally I was really, I 
guess you would say, a basket case. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 532 N.W.2d 235, 239–40 (Minn. Ct. 
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that Gertz required proof of actual damages, but concluded that 
Gertz did not require proof of actual injury to reputation as a 
prerequisite to recovery in a defamation case.74 
While recognizing that damages are presumed in cases 
involving accusations of incest, the court of appeals also concluded 
that under the circumstances, “[a]t least ‘some’ actual injury to 
their reputations can be assumed from the seriousness of this false 
statement seen on national TV, at least enough to survive a motion 
for summary judgment.”75 “Common sense,” the court observed, 
“tells us that of the hundreds of thousands of possible viewers not 
all, as a matter of law, thought absolutely nothing ill of appellants, 
if only to a small degree.”76 The court realized that a jury could 
conclude that the reputations of the appellants were not damaged, 
and that the specific evidence of injury they offered in opposing 
the summary judgment motion was not overwhelming, but that it 
was sufficient to avoid summary judgment.77 
The supreme court reversed, holding that: 
absent allegations of actual malice, in order to survive a 
summary judgment motion in a defamation action 
concerning statements made by the media and involving a 
matter of public concern, there must be a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Gerten and Richie suffered 
actual harm; damages cannot be presumed.78 
Permitting recovery for presumed damages in those cases would 
violate the First Amendment. While the Supreme Court of the 
United States has permitted recovery of actual damages for 
emotional harm, even absent actual injury to reputation,79 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota law would not 
permit recovery for those damages absent proof of actual injury to 
reputation.80 That part of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding 
is not grounded in the First Amendment.81 The court 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s holding in Gertz did not 
 
App. 1995), rev’d, 544 N.W.2d 21. 
 74.  Id. at 239. 
 75.  Id. at 240. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 26 (Minn. 1996).  
 79.  Id. at 27 (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976)). 
 80.  Id. at 28. 
 81.  See id. at 27–28. 
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mandate a rule requiring proof of actual injury to reputation as a 
predicate to the recovery of damages for emotional harm.82 The 
court took that position as a matter of Minnesota common law.83 
The court’s holding is confined to cases involving private figures 
involved in public issues who bring defamation suits against media 
defendants.84 
Nonetheless, the rule could readily be used as a foundation for 
an argument that actual injury to reputation should be a 
requirement in all defamation cases, particularly if the basic 
premise of the holding is deemed to be dispositive. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court concluded in Richie that reputation is the principal 
interest protected by defamation law, with the interest in 
vindicating mental distress the function of a not-then adopted law 
of invasion of privacy. The fact that the supreme court adopted 
three branches of the tort of invasion of privacy in 199885 is 
obviously irrelevant to the court’s conclusion that the purpose of 
defamation law is to vindicate reputational interests, but from 
Hubbard Broadcasting v. United Press International 86 in 1983 on, the 
supreme court’s decisions illustrate a continuing skepticism of 
stand-alone emotional distress claims.87 Richie, in emphasizing that 
protection of reputation is the principal purpose of defamation 
law, coupled with the supreme court’s skepticism over damages 
claims for emotional distress, could be the basis for an argument 
that actual damages should be a requirement in all defamation 
cases. 
On the other hand, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Village of Isle, the supreme court concluded that damages for 
emotional harm are not compensable absent proof of physical 
injury “unless there has been some conduct on the part of 
defendant constituting a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights 
 
 82.  Id. at 27. 
 83.  See id. at 27–28. 
 84.  Id. at 26. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not confronted the issue of 
whether the media/nonmedia defendant distinction noted in Richie will be 
maintained. Some courts maintain that distinction. See Bierman v. Weier, 
826 N.W.2d 436, 448 (Iowa 2013) (noting that the United States Supreme Court 
does not mandate the distinction, but that it is “a well-established component of 
Iowa’s defamation law”). 
 85.  Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). 
 86.  330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). 
 87.  See, e.g., Langeslag v. KYMN Inc., 664 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Minn. 2003); 
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995); Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439. 
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such as that constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, 
seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct.”88 
That means that the plaintiff will not have to meet the more rigid 
requirements of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim if 
the plaintiff establishes the underlying defamation claim.89 
The court in Richie distinguished State Farm and the cases that 
have followed it because “[n]one of the cases in any way stated that 
emotional harm alone, unaccompanied by harm to reputation, 
could sustain a defamation claim.”90 But neither did those cases 
hold that emotional harm could not be recovered absent injury to 
reputation. Other Minnesota cases, including Thorson v. Albert Lea 
Publishing Co.,91 take the position that mental damage is an element 
of the general damages that are recoverable in libel actions.92 
There is also a deep history in Minnesota supporting the 
presumed damages rule. The early Minnesota cases took the 
position that libels were actionable per se, that is, without proof of 
special damage.93 The presumed damages rule was directly 
challenged in 1987 in Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Engineering Co., 
but the supreme court was unconvinced that it “should overrule 
long-established precedent in favor of a new rule.”94 The presumed 
 
 88.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 367–68, 
122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963) (emphasis added). 
 89.  In Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992), a case involving emotional distress and defamation claims, the court of 
appeals, citing State Farm, noted that the evidence of physical manifestations of 
distress suffered by the plaintiff were minimal. One of the plaintiffs “complained 
that she developed compulsive scratching and was reluctant to venture out into 
local areas after the article appeared in the paper.” Id. at 144. The other plaintiffs 
did not testify to any physical manifestations of distress, but the court of appeals 
held that “[d]espite this minimal showing,” the district court should have 
permitted the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim to proceed to the 
jury insofar as it was supported by the underlying defamation claim. Id. Because 
the defamation claim failed, however, the court of appeals held that it was 
harmless error. Id.  
 90.  Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996). 
 91.  190 Minn. 200, 204–05, 251 N.W. 177, 179 (1933). 
 92.  See also Bradley v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 93.  E.g., Byram v. Aikin, 65 Minn. 87, 87, 67 N.W. 807, 808 (1896); Holston v. 
Boyle, 46 Minn. 432, 433, 49 N.W. 203, 204 (1891); Newell v. How, 31 Minn. 235, 
236, 17 N.W. 383, 383 (1883).  
 94.  Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 
1987). 
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damages rule remains the law for slander per se and libel cases in 
Minnesota, except for Richie’s modification. 
The supreme court has consistently taken the position that 
vindication of reputation is the primary purpose of defamation,95 
but it is not the only interest. In Yencho v. Kruly, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, commenting on the insidious nature of a 
slanderous statement concerning a married woman, realized the 
difficulty in determining the exact damages in such a case, but 
noted that “[t]he primary object in a case of this character is: (1) to 
obtain a verdict that will compensate the plaintiff for the injury 
done her, (2) to operate as an example or deterrent to others, and 
(3) to serve as a punishment to defendant.”96 
B. A Survey of Minnesota Defamation Cases 
A survey of Minnesota defamation cases over the past twenty 
years reveals that many of the cases arise in the context of 
employment claims where there are no First Amendment 
considerations.97 Most of the defamation claims fit within the 
 
 95.  Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 
(Minn. 1985) (“Throughout history, personal reputation has been cherished as 
important and highly worthy of protection.”); Bauer v. Gannett Co. (Kare 11), 557 
N.W.2d 608, 610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (“[O]f great importance to a just and fair 
society is the right of individuals to protect and defend their reputations.”), 
overruled by Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667, 675 n.9 (Minn. 
2003) (overruling statutory disclosure requirements). 
 96.  Yencho v. Kruly, 158 Minn. 408, 410, 197 N.W. 752, 753 (1924). The 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, division 5, chapter 27, Special Note on 
Remedies for Defamation Other Than Damages (1977) is to the same effect: 
   The tort law of libel and slander has been conceived as of serving 
three separate functions: (1) to compensate the plaintiff for the injury 
to his reputation, for his pecuniary losses and for his emotional 
distress, (2) to vindicate him and aid in restoring his reputation and 
(3) to punish the defendant and dissuade him and others from 
publishing defamatory statements. 
 97.  See, e.g., Bolton v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 540 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1995) 
(a former government employee who was escorted out of his office after 
termination); Huonder v. Specialty Mfg. Co., No. A10-47, 2010 WL 2733454 
(Minn. Ct. App. July 13, 2010) (an employer’s decision to terminate a former 
employee based on the employee’s alleged forging of a check); Groeneweg v. 
Interstate Enters., No. A04-1290, 2005 WL 894768 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2005) 
(activities that occurred at a former employee’s termination meeting); Mercure v. 
W. Publ’g Corp., No. A03-823, 2003 WL 23024519 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003) 
(a former employee’s claim of defamation based on the employer’s description of 
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“defamation per se” categories alleging either criminal misconduct 
or conduct that relates to the plaintiff’s profession or trade.98 And 
 
her performance); Petrovic v. Ridgeview Country Club, No. C6-01-1474, 2002 
WL 765490 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (a former employee’s claim that her 
employer made disparaging remarks about her after she ended her employment); 
Lundell v. Maranatha Baptist Care Ctr., Inc., No. C7-99-87, 1999 WL 540186 
(Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 1999) (a former employee’s claim that documents 
detailing the employee’s poor performance were defamatory); Strandquist v. 
Medtronic, Inc., No. C4-97-995, 1997 WL 714742 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1997) 
(employer who told customers the reasons for an employee’s termination); 
Jeambey v. Synod of Lakes & Prairies, Presbyterian Church, No. CX-95-902, 1995 
WL 619814 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1995) (pastor fired after being involved in an 
affair sought to recover for internal communications and publication in church 
paper); Yoos v. State, No. CX-94-2574, 1995 WL 479560 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 
1995) (an employer who made comments to the press regarding an employee’s 
termination); Willis v. Cnty. of Sherburne, Nos. C5-95-371, -363, 1995 WL 479640 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1995) (employer released a letter critical of a former 
employee to the local press), aff’d and remanded, 555 N.W.2d 277 (Minn. 1996); 
Bichsel v. State, No. C1-95-240, 1995 WL 434444 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 1995) (a 
former employee who claimed to be terminated due to her involvement in 
whistleblowing); Meyer v. Electro Static Finishing, Inc., No. C8-94-2637, 1995 
WL 366093 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 1995) (a former employee who was 
terminated after appearing to be “on drugs” and failing to submit timely reports to 
the EPA); Olson v. Whittier Alliance, No. C7-94-1088, 1994 WL 637786 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Nov. 15, 1994) (a former employee claiming to be terminated based on age 
and gender); Kesller v. Willmar Cookie & Nut Co., No. C5-93-2309, 1994 
WL 411667 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1994) (a former employee who was 
terminated after refusing to date a supervisor); Daig Corp. v. Reich, No. C1-94-258, 
1994 WL 284966 (Minn. Ct. App. June 28, 1994) (a former employee who was 
terminated after an employer received complaints about the employee’s 
performance); Olchefski v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, No. C9-93-417, 1993 WL 302116 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993) (an employment dispute arising from an open 
letter published by an employee to other employees). 
 98.  See, e.g., McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. 2013) (physician 
plaintiff’s defamation per se claim against a patient’s son’s potentially defamatory 
statements made online); State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 2012) (finding 
defamation per se based on making knowingly false police reports); Bahr v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009) (defamation in the workplace 
between coworkers); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 
1980) (false statements made by an employer during an employee 
recommendation); Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. Standard Water Control 
Sys., Inc., No. A07-1828, 2008 WL 4300258 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2008) 
(defamation during negotiations with a third party attempting to select a 
contractor); Prinzing v. Schwab, No. A05-398, 2006 WL 538926 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 7, 2006) (the posting of signs falsely accusing a state senator of being a thief); 
Schlieman v. Gannett Minn. Broad., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(a police officer alleging defamation by a television station based on a published 
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most defamation claims are disposed of on summary judgment, on 
various grounds, before the presumed damages issue becomes a 
factor.99 
 
investigative report into a police shooting); Jerdee v. Guenther, No. CX-01-473, 
2001 WL 1568837 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2001) (defamation in statements made 
to police officers); Fieno v. State, 567 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (false 
statements on a written reprimand and performance evaluation following an 
employee’s filing of complaints with the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights); Benigni v. Cnty. of St. Louis, No. C0-94-2549, 1995 WL 146822 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 4, 1995) (a claim that the defendant accused the plaintiff of committing 
assault); Steele v. Tell, No. C2-94-981, 1994 WL 593924 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 
1994) (a report that plaintiff potentially committed criminal sexual conduct). 
 99.  See, e.g., Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 910 (dismissed on motion for judgment as a 
matter of law due to a lack of evidence of actual malice); Bolton, 540 N.W.2d at 523 
(dismissed on summary judgment as the act of walking a plaintiff to the door was 
not considered defamation); Schimming v. Equity Servs. of St. Paul, Inc., No. A11-
1573, 2012 WL 1380395, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2012) (dismissed on 
summary judgment based on a qualified privilege); Desmonde v. Nystrom & 
Assocs., No. A09-0221, 2009 WL 2596059, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2009) 
(dismissed on summary judgment based on the qualified privilege of office 
manager); Lewis v. St. Cloud State Univ., 693 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) 
(dismissed on summary judgment as defendants who lacked editorial control of a 
student newspaper could not be liable for defamatory statements published in the 
newspaper); Iverson v. Shogren, No. A03-1299, 2004 WL 885769, at *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 27, 2004) (dismissed on summary judgment based on a qualified 
privilege in communications with a 911 operator); Davisson v. Engelke, No. C0-97-
265, 1997 WL 585818, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1997) (dismissed on 
summary judgment because statements made to police were protected under a 
qualified privilege); Jeambey, 1995 WL 619814, at *1 (dismissed on summary 
judgment because a review of church policies involves excessive entanglement); 
Bichsel, 1995 WL 434444, at *8 (dismissed on summary judgment because there 
was no statement of actual facts to sustain the defamation claim); Freed v. First 
Am. Bank of Willmar, No. C6-94-2314, 1995 WL 146836, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 4, 1995) (dismissed on summary judgment because the defamation claim was 
based on truthful statements); Sundae v. Scot, 529 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995) (dismissed on summary judgment based on appellant’s lack of 
standing to assert defamation claim that was part of bankruptcy estate); Heiling v. 
State, No. C0-94-493, 1994 WL 396331 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1994) (deferring to 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on an absolute privilege); 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Reid, 522 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (dismissed on summary judgment based on absolute immunity); Adams v. 
Hayne, Miller, & Farni, Inc., No. C5-94-165, 1994 WL 425189, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 16, 1994) (dismissed on summary judgment because the case was 
barred by the statute of limitations); Dillavou v. Schaffner, No. C7-94-362, 1994 
WL 373324, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 19, 1994) (dismissed on summary judgment 
because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a jury question 
regarding malice); Dorn v. Peterson, 512 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) 
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C. Excessive Damages Claims 
Presumed damages are difficult to quantify and difficult to 
constrain because by definition they do not have to be supported 
by proof of actual harm. All district courts have to do is instruct the 
jury that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for harm to 
reputation, but that “[n]o evidence of actual harm is required.”100 
In cases involving the award of substantial damages that seem to be 
out of tune with the facts, a dilemma arises for courts in reviewing 
the damages awards. If the damages award does not have to be 
supported by proof of actual damages, courts have difficulty in 
limiting the awards. 
Challenges to damages awards in defamation cases, as in other 
torts cases, may be based on a motion for a new trial or 
remittitur.101 The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provide that 
 
(dismissed on summary judgment based on absolute privilege in quasi-judicial 
proceeding); Thompto v. Abbott-Nw. Hosp., No. C4-93-213, 1993 WL 328780 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1993) (dismissed on summary judgment due to plaintiff’s 
failure to specifically plead the defamatory statements; defamatory statements by 
employees were not in the scope of their authority; and supervisor had a qualified 
privilege). 
 100.  4 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES—CIVIL 50.50 (5th ed. 2006).  
 101.  For example, in Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 
1994), the supreme court sustained a wrongful death damages award of 
$1,007,857.84 against a school district that arose out of a drowning accident. The 
school district argued that the damages award was excessive and that it was entitled 
either to a new trial or remittitur. The supreme court noted the Minnesota Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59.01(e) standard, which permits a district court to grant a new 
trial if the damages award was influenced by “passion or prejudice,” and that the 
district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial would not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. The same standard applies to a denial of a motion for 
remittitur. Id. at 601. The court has “stated that a verdict should be set aside if it 
‘shocks the conscience.’” Id. at 602 (citing Verhel v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 
359 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Minn. 1984)). 
The court in Johnson reasoned that the district court properly denied the 
motions for a new trial and remittitur: 
   The trial court compared the $1,007,857.84 verdict in this case with 
a list of wrongful death verdicts from throughout the country, 
including a Michigan case where a $1,145,000 verdict for the death of a 
thirteen-year-old boy was held to not be excessive. The trial court in 
this case concluded that the verdict of over $1,000,000 “does not shock 
the conscience of this Court” and therefore denied the motion of a 
new trial based on excessive damages. Similarly, the trial court denied 
the motion for remittitur. We note, as did the court of appeals, that the 
24
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“[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties” because of 
“[e]xcessive or insufficient damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice.”102 The test for 
determining the excessiveness of a damages award is whether it 
shocks the conscience103 or is the result of passion and prejudice.104 
A district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial on grounds of 
excessiveness will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of 
discretion.105 Because the standards for awarding presumed 
damages in defamation cases are somewhat elusive, appellate courts 
have difficulty in evaluating claims that damages awards are 
excessive. The consequence is that the courts are generally liberal 
in evaluating the awards. There are several examples of how this 
plays out in Minnesota defamation cases. 
In Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., the jury awarded the 
plaintiff $17,250 for actual pecuniary loss, $10,500 in compensatory 
damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages in a slander per se case 
that involved defamation of the plaintiff’s business reputation.106 In 
reviewing the award, the supreme court noted that the publication 
of the defamatory remarks was limited, but that “their devastating 
quality satisfies us that the jury award of compensatory damages was 
justified.”107 
In Bauer v. State, the plaintiff, a state employee, was awarded 
$120,000 by a jury on her defamation claim against her supervisor 
based upon various statements he made, including that she was 
 
jury received proper instructions, that a precise formula for calculating 
the loss suffered in this case does not exist, and that evidence 
demonstrated the close relationship Brandon had with his parents and 
sister. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying the motion for a new trial or remittitur because the damage 
award was excessive even though we would have affirmed had the trial 
court granted the motion for remittitur. 
Id. at 602 (citations omitted). 
 102.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 59.01(e). 
 103.  E.g., Verhel, 359 N.W.2d at 591; DeWitt v. Schuhbauer, 287 Minn. 279, 
286, 177 N.W.2d 790, 795 (1970). 
 104.  E.g., Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Minn. 1981); DeWitt, 287 
Minn. at 286, 177 N.W.2d at 795. 
 105.  E.g., Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., Inc., 352 N.W.2d 
1, 11 (Minn. 1984); Stenzel v. Bach, 295 Minn. 257, 260, 203 N.W.2d 819, 822 
(1973). 
 106.  Stuempges v. Parke, 297 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1980). 
 107.  Id. at 259. 
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“seductive.”108 The supervisor argued that the damages award “was 
excessive, based on jury passion or bias, and unsupported by the 
record.”109 The court of appeals sustained the damages award, 
noting simply that “[w]hen a ‘defendant commits libel per se, 
general and punitive damages are recoverable without proof of 
actual damages,’”110 and that “[i]n defamation actions general 
damages are imposed for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff 
for the harm that the publication has caused to his reputation.”111 
The jury also awarded the plaintiff $40,000 for “[m]ental 
distress, embarrassment or physical disability,” and $40,000 for 
“[e]conomic loss caused by the defamatory statement.”112 The court 
held that “[u]nlike her damages for loss of reputation, which do 
not require proof of actual damages, Bauer’s damages for mental 
distress and economic loss must be supported by proof of actual 
damages,” and that there was insufficient evidence at trial to prove 
that the defamatory statements caused Bauer any mental distress or 
economic loss.113 
The court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 622 
in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to justify the 
damages award for mental distress.114 While a physician testified 
that the plaintiff suffered from depression and was unable to work, 
he was only able to testify that the symptoms were proximately 
caused by unfair treatment in the workplace, and aggravated by the 
legal maneuvering of the defendants, and not that the symptoms 
were caused by the defamatory statements.115 Section 622 provides 
that “[o]ne who is liable for either a slander actionable per se or a 
libel is also liable for any special harm legally caused by the 
defamatory publication.”116 Section 623 provides that “[o]ne who is 
liable to another for a libel or slander is liable also for emotional 
distress and bodily harm that is proved to have been caused by the 
 
 108.  Bauer v. State, Nos. C2-95-1090, C6-95-1335, 1996 WL 601647, at *1, *5 
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1996). 
 109.  Id. at *7. 
 110.  Id. (citing Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 
(Minn. 1987)). 
 111.  Bauer, 1996 WL 601647, at *7. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 622 (1977).  
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defamatory publication.”117 It is an actual damages requirement. 
While the Restatement supports the court’s conclusion on the 
emotional distress issue, it is inconsistent with other Minnesota 
decisions in which damages for emotional harm are presumed in 
defamation cases. 
In Prinzing v. Schwab, the plaintiff, a state senator, was sued by a 
citizen claiming that the senator committed conversion in 
removing some letters from a mobile sign the citizen posted 
accusing the senator of theft.118 The senator counterclaimed, 
alleging that the plaintiff defamed her by accusing her of theft 
through the placement of signs in her district in the weeks leading 
up to the election, which the senator lost.119 The jury awarded her 
$150,000 in damages.120 The court noted that damages are 
presumed in cases involving accusations of criminal wrongdoing,121 
but it proceeded to hold that the evidence justified the damages 
award, notwithstanding that presumption: 
Prinzing’s signs were placed around Schwab’s senate 
district during the weeks before the election. There was 
extensive publicity in both print and television media 
regarding Prinzing’s signs. Schwab testified that she 
experienced severe stress, manifested by headaches and 
sleeplessness, from the signs and accompanying publicity. 
And the signs put stress on her children and marriage. 
Because of the signs, she was personally humiliated, and 
one of her children was taunted in school. Not only did 
Schwab lose her reelection bid, but she also has lost 
interest in seeking elected office because the experience 
was so difficult for her. The evidence establishes that 
Schwab accepted a job in St. Paul, in part, to work in a 
community that was unaware of Prinzing’s actions. As a 
result, Schwab’s time with her family has been reduced 
because she now lives in St. Paul during the week while 
her family remains in Albert Lea. On this record, the 
jury’s damages award is not manifestly contrary to the 
 
 117.  Id. § 623. 
 118.  Prinzing v. Schwab, No. A05–398, 2006 WL 538926, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 7, 2006). 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at *5. Schwab was a public official, of course, but she established that 
the defamatory statements were made with actual malice. Id. at *3. 
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evidence, nor is its amount indicative of partiality or 
prejudice.122 
Prinzing argued that the damages award was inconsistent with 
precedent from other jurisdictions, suggesting that the award 
would be excessive, but the court concluded that the award was 
consistent with Minnesota precedent.123 
In Thorson v. Albert Lea Publishing Co., the supreme court noted 
that “[w]hat may be presumed may be proved” in a defamation 
case.124 In many cases plaintiffs will introduce evidence of actual 
damages, and courts reviewing a jury’s award of presumed damages 
will review that evidence in determining whether or not a damages 
award is excessive. That has led at least one commentator to 
suggest that courts are really applying actual damages rules to 
determine whether a presumed damages award will stand.125 In the 
alternative, of course, a court reviewing a damages award cannot 
very well ignore the evidence of actual damages in deciding if an 
award is excessive. 
LeDoux v. Northwest Publishing, Inc.,126 is a good example. The 
jury in that case awarded the plaintiff, a city street maintenance 
supervisor, $676,000 in damages in his defamation suit against 
Northwest Publishing for newspaper articles questioning his job 
performance.127 The court of appeals held that the jury award was 
supported by the evidence: 
The evidence . . . demonstrates that LeDoux: (1) felt 
“devastated” after reading the editorials published by 
appellants; (2) has difficulty sleeping, digestive problems, 
headaches, nausea, vomiting, and chest pains; 
(3) contemplated committing suicide and sought 
counseling because the “newspaper articles kept coming 
and coming”; (4) withdrew from his sons and became 
more moody; and (5) attempts to avoid being identified 
in public or at work, for fear of embarrassment. We 
conclude a reasonable jury could find that LeDoux was 
 
 122.  Id. at *5. 
 123.  Id. (citing LeDoux v. Nw. Publ’g, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 59, 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994)). 
 124.  Thorson v. Albert Lea Publ’g Co., 190 Minn. 200, 204, 251 N.W. 177, 179 
(1933). 
 125.  T. Michael Mather, Experience with Gertz ‘Actual Injury’ in Defamation Cases, 
38 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 955–56 (1986). 
 126.  521 N.W.2d 59. 
 127.  Id. at 64. 
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harmed and that the published statements were a direct 
cause of LeDoux’s damages. Accordingly, the trial court 
did not err in refusing to disturb the jury’s damage 
award.128 
Because the news article implied improper conduct by 
LeDoux, the court held that a jury reasonably could conclude that 
the articles harmed LeDoux’s reputation. Also, because the 
evidence indicated that after the publication of the news articles 
some individuals called LeDoux a thief and refused to speak with 
him, the court held that “a jury reasonably could conclude that the 
false statements in the news articles were defamatory.”129 
In Frankson v. Design Space International, a case arising out of the 
plaintiff’s termination of employment with the defendant, the jury 
awarded the plaintiff $70,000 on his defamation claim.130 The court 
of appeals sustained the award: 
Because the statements made by [Design Space 
International (DSI)] were defamatory per se as 
defamations of Frankson’s business reputation, general 
damages are presumed. The appellate courts tend to leave 
the amount to be awarded to the jury’s discretion. In this 
case, Frankson chose not to pursue sales employment 
elsewhere, but instead opened his own business. He 
testified that he knew he would not be hired by any 
company because DSI’s stated reason for terminating him 
was his failure to increase business. It was for the jury to 
assess the weight and credibility of this testimony. 
Moreover, the jury received an instruction on Frankson’s 
duty to mitigate damages, which would operate to lessen 
their award to Frankson because he in fact did not seek 
other employment. The jury nevertheless chose to believe 
Frankson’s assessment of his earning prospects and 
awarded $70,000.131 
DSI argued that smaller damages awards in other cases 
involving more extensive publication or evidence of more 
substantial pecuniary loss supported its argument of 
excessiveness.132 In rejecting the argument, the court of appeals 
 
 128.  Id. at 69. 
 129.  Id. at 68. 
 130.  Frankson v. Design Space Int’l, 380 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986). 
 131.  Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted). 
 132.  Id. at 568. 
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summed up the problem of reviewing damages awards for 
excessiveness, noting simply that “[a] wide range of damage awards 
is inevitable in varying fact situations considered by different 
juries.”133 
These cases illustrate the difficulties in reviewing damages 
awards in defamation cases. They also demonstrate that plaintiffs 
will typically try to prove actual harm, whether to reputation or 
emotional harm. The presumed damages rule is a sort of safety net, 
but it also seems to be the case that reviewing courts will seize upon 
the actual evidence in the case to justify sustaining damages awards 
that may otherwise appear to be nebulous. 
V. SUMMARY 
The justifications advanced for the presumed damages rule in 
defamation cases point to the overriding state interest in protecting 
reputation and the difficulty—if not impossibility—of proving 
actual injury to reputation. That interest and the interest in being 
free from the emotional harm caused by defamation are vindicated 
in the Minnesota cases, as a matter of law and as a matter of 
practice. Minnesota decisions recognize the primacy of the 
reputational interest in defamation law, but it is not the only 
interest vindicated by the tort. The presumed damages rule covers 
not only presumed harm to reputation, but also emotional 
suffering. 
The Minnesota appellate courts have not directly addressed 
the inequity in permitting recovery for presumed damages for libel, 
and slander, where the defamatory statement falls in one of the 
slander per se categories. Perhaps this is because the inconsistency 
is obscured by the continuing use of the term “defamation per se,” 
which injects the categories of words that are slanderous per se into 
libel law, in which damages are presumed even if the libelous words 
do not fit those categories. If the slander per se categories are 
imported into defamation law, however, the inequity in allowing 
presumed damages only for certain types of defamatory words is 
apparent, even while the justification for the distinction is 
explainable in terms of defamation history. Nonetheless, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has not been receptive to attempts to 
 
 133.  Id.  
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limit the presumed damages rule, rejecting a direct attack on the 
rule in Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Engineering Co.134 
Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp. does not directly address the 
presumed damages rule, but the supreme court’s requirement of 
proof of actual harm to reputation as a predicate to recovery for 
actual damages for emotional harm at least suggests that there are 
nonconstitutional justifications for limiting recovery in defamation 
actions to actual damages.135 Richie leaves the presumed damages 
rule intact, however. 
The district courts do not have an easy time in instructing a 
jury on presumed damages.136 Giving more detailed guidance in 
defining the scope of damages is problematic, of course, given that 
damages are presumed in the first place. If the instructions edge 
toward some sort of causal link between the defamatory statement 
and injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, or constrain the jury’s 
discretion by unduly emphasizing one aspect of the defamatory 
statement, including limited publication, they may run afoul of the 
presumed damages rule. 
The defamation decisions in the supreme court and court of 
appeals could be used to support a claim that the presumed 
damages rule is difficult to limit. Appellate decisions in Minnesota 
illustrate that the courts are somewhat constrained from closely 
examining damages awards as against claims that they were 
excessive, and with good reason. Presumed damages are just that. 
Nonetheless, if courts consider as an outside boundary the kinds of 
damages that normally flow from the defamatory communications, 
they have at least one basic tool to limit excessive damages awards. 
The appellate reviews tend to focus on the evidence of actual injury 
to reputation or mental stress suffered by the plaintiff, which 
provides a more concrete basis for evaluating a damages award. In 
the end, however, courts reviewing the damages awards are limited 
in the depth of their review of damages awards. 
On the other hand, plaintiffs do attempt to prove actual 
damages even where damages are presumed. As Thorson pointed 
out, what is presumed can be proved.137 The evidence may be of the 
breadth of publication. That was evidence the court of appeals 
 
 134.  401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987). 
 135.  See supra notes 62–87 and accompanying text. 
 136.  See infra Part V. 
 137.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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thought sufficient in the Richie case.138 It may be of actual mental 
distress sustained by the plaintiff. In some cases, the claim for 
mental suffering may outstrip any claim for injury to reputation. 
Defamation cases are difficult to win in Minnesota, even in 
presumed damages cases. Most of the defamation claims that are 
asserted are dismissed on motions for summary judgment, for 
various reasons, whether because the plaintiff has not alleged a 
false statement of fact, or because the defendant has either a 
qualified or absolute immunity in making the allegedly defamatory 
statement.139 Many of the defamation claims that are asserted are 
“defamation per se” claims that trigger the presumed damages rule, 
but plaintiffs also attempt to prove actual damages in the cases that 
go to trial. That proof could support recovery under an actual 
damages rule. 
VI. LONGBEHN V. SCHOENROCK 
The first in the Longbehn series of decisions arose out of claims 
against several defendants by a city police officer who was 
discharged from his position and allegedly defamed by statements 
made by the police chief, and in unrelated incidents, by two other 
individuals.140 The case ultimately spanned eleven years, from the 
filing of the complaint to the fourth and final trial in the case. 
Patrick Longbehn was discharged from his position as a Moose 
Lake police officer.141 He brought suit against Moose Lake and the 
Moose Lake police chief alleging various employment related 
claims and separate defamation claims against Robin Schoenrock 
and Thomas Michael Cich.142 
Three separate groups of claims were involved in the suit.143 
The first involved claims arising out of Longbehn’s discharge from 
employment.144 The second claim was for defamation against Cich, 
 
 138.  See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See supra text accompanying note 99. 
 140.  See Plaintiff’s Complaint, Longbehn v. City of Moose Lake, No. C5-01-681, 
2001 WL 36209854 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 30, 2001). See Trial Order, Longbehn v. 
City of Moose Lake, No. C5-01-681, 2002 WL 34438284 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 
2002) for the district court’s order. 
 141.  Longbehn v. City of Moose Lake, No. A04-1214, 2005 WL 1153625, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 2005). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at *2. 
 144.  Id. at *1. 
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a retired Duluth Police Department police officer who allegedly 
made defamatory statements about Longbehn in a background 
check that was being conducted by the St. Paul Police 
Department.145 The third was a claim for defamation, along with 
claims for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, against Schoenrock.146 Those claims arose out of a phone 
conversation Robin Schoenrock had with Charles Wilson, a friend 
of Longbehn’s, who was at a party also attended by Schoenrock’s 
daughter.147 There were several phone calls between Schoenrock 
and Wilson to secure arrangements for providing Schoenrock’s 
daughter and another girl home from the party.148 Wilson stated 
that during one of the calls, Schoenrock referred to Longbehn as 
“Pat the Pedophile.”149 
The claims against the City and police chief were dismissed on 
summary judgment by the district court.150 The claims against Cich 
and Longbehn were consolidated for trial, but were dismissed with 
prejudice.151 Longbehn appealed.152 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court on all claims 
except for Longbehn’s claims for defamation and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress against Schoenrock. The court of 
appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal of the defamation 
claim, concluding that when Schoenrock referred to Longbehn as 
“Pat the Pedophile,” it suggested “a propensity toward committing, 
if not the commission of, a sex crime,” and that the statement was 
defamatory per se because it alleged sexual misconduct.153 The 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim survived because it 
rode in on the coattails of the defamation claim.154 
 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at *11. 
 154.  Id. at *12 (taking the position that it is unnecessary for a plaintiff seeking 
to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress to prove physical harm 
arising out of the emotional distress where the plaintiff proceeds under a 
defamation theory). There are problems in concluding that negligent infliction of 
emotional distress may be asserted in cases where the plaintiff alleges a defamation 
claim. See Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in 
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At trial after remand, the jury found that: 
(1) respondent called appellant “Pat the Pedophile” but 
did not accuse appellant of actually being a pedophile; 
(2) respondent’s defamatory publication was made under 
circumstances that made it negligent; (3) respondent’s 
publication caused appellant emotional distress so severe 
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; 
and (4) clear and convincing evidence established that 
respondent acted in deliberate disregard for appellant’s 
rights and safety.155 
The jury awarded Longbehn: 
 $230,000 for past and future harm to reputation, mental 
distress, humiliation, and embarrassment; 
 $3000 for future health-care expenses; 
 $90,000 for past and future wage loss; and 
 $250,000 for punitive damages.156 
The district court granted Schoenrock’s motion for judgment 
as a matter of law (JMOL) and directed entry of judgment in 
Schoenrock’s favor. The district court found that the statement was 
not defamatory per se, that there was no evidentiary basis for the 
jury’s finding of a causal link between Schoenrock’s statement and 
Longbehn’s general or special damages, and that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify the punitive damages award and the award of 
general damages.157 
On appeal to the court of appeals, the appellant’s brief was 
devoted primarily to disputing the trial court’s findings on the 
 
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 84–86 (1993). Emotional distress is a 
recoverable element of damage in defamation, which raises the issue of why a 
separate claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is necessary in those 
cases. The real issue is whether the plaintiff, asserting the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim, should be entitled to recover if the defamation claim 
fails. If not, it is meaningless to permit the assertion of the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim as a defamation adjunct. If it is allowed when the 
defamation claim fails, the issue is why it should be subjected to a lesser standard 
than a free-standing claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Covey v. 
Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), the court of 
appeals held that failure of the defamation claim precluded assertion of a claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, absent proof of physical symptoms. 
See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 155.  Longbehn v. Schoenrock, 727 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id.  
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JMOL issue, but the short statement of facts reveals the broad 
theory of the case against Schoenrock: 
This case was an action for defamation. The Appellant 
was a police officer with the City of Moose Lake. On 
January 1, 2001, Respondent Schoenrock published to a 
third person the name ‘Pat the Pedophile’ in describing 
Appellant. As a result of that name, Appellant lost his job, 
his relationship, and suffered severe emotional distress.158 
The claim is that the nickname was published to a third person, 
and then, “[a]s a result of that name,” the “Appellant lost his job, his 
relationship, and suffered emotional distress.”159 The link between 
Schoenrock’s use of the nickname and Longbehn’s damages is not 
argued in the statement of facts. 
The trial court concluded that “[t]here was no evidence 
offered to establish that outside of his single telephone call with 
Mr. Wilson[,] Defendant, Mr. Wilson, or anyone associated with 
either Mr. Wilson or Defendant used that telephone call to 
promote the nickname of ‘Pat the Pedophile’ to anyone else.”160 
The argument in the appellant’s brief is that he did provide 
circumstantial evidence of Schoenrock’s “coining of that name.”161 
The brief argued that Longbehn’s testimony in response to 
questioning by Schoenrock’s attorney to the effect that one person, 
Schoenrock’s stepdaughter, told Longbehn that Schoenrock had 
“coined and circulated the name.”162 Longbehn argued that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish the “coining” allegation.163 Even 
if it was not sufficient, the brief argued, “why would anyone say 
such a thing about another person without knowing its truth or 
falsity, and knowing the serious consequences that attach to such a 
label[?]”164 Later, in challenging the district court’s conclusion that 
Longbehn’s termination from employment and subsequent 
emotional problems arose after he left his job, the brief argues that 
 
 158.  Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 3, Longbehn, 727 N.W.2d 153, 2006 
WL 4091706; see also Longbehn, 727 N.W.2d at 157. 
 159.  Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 158, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 160.  Id. at 10. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 10–11. 
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the main reason for his termination “was the name he had been 
saddled with by the Respondent.”165 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court in part and 
reversed in part (Longbehn II).166 The court of appeals affirmed the 
district court’s conclusions on the special damages issues, holding 
that the evidence was insufficient to justify that award.167 The court 
of appeals concluded that the defendant used the offensive 
nickname on a single isolated occasion and that there was no 
evidence in the record to support the claim that the defendant 
either originated the name or participated in its dissemination so 
as to make him responsible for repetition by others, thereby 
rejecting Longbehn’s “coining” argument.168 The court of appeals 
noted that the plaintiff was commonly known in the Moose Lake 
community by the nickname, and that there was no evidence that 
linked the defendant’s use of the nickname on one isolated 
occasion to the plaintiff’s termination or to any loss of prospective 
employment.169 
The court of appeals held that Schoenrock’s reference to 
Longbehn was defamatory per se, however.170 The district court 
held that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish a causal 
connection between the defamatory statement and the general 
damages awarded by the jury. The court of appeals, mindful that 
this was a defamation per se case where general damages are 
presumed and no proof of actual harm is required, held that the 
 
 165.  Id. at 11. The general rule is that a person who makes a defamatory 
statement is subject to liability for subsequent repetitions of that statement. See, 
e.g., Barnette v. Wilson, 706 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Ala. 1997); Geraci v. Probst, 
938 N.E.2d 917, 921 (N.Y. 2010). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 576 
(1977), provides that damages for special harm may be recovered under limited 
circumstances: 
   The publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special 
harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, 
(a) the third person was privileged to repeat it, or 
(b) the repetition was authorized or intended by the original defamer, 
or 
(c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected. 
 166.  Longbehn v. Schoenrock, 727 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 167.  Id. at 163. 
 168.  Id. at 160–61. 
 169.  Id.  
 170.  Id. at 158. 
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trial court erred in requiring a causal connection between the 
statement and general damages.171 
Troubled by the amount of the award, however, the court of 
appeals held that it was excessive. The court commented on the 
difficulty in establishing guidelines for evaluating presumed 
damages awards,172 and then quoted from the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, 
for it allows recovery of . . . damages without evidence of 
actual loss. . . . Juries may award substantial sums as 
compensation for supposed damage to reputation without 
any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely 
uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where 
there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of 
any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit 
the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms . . . . 
[T]he States have no substantial interest in securing for 
plaintiffs . . . gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury.173 
The court of appeals recognized that in Richie v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp.,174 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment limitations in Gertz are inapplicable in cases where a 
private plaintiff sues a private defendant on an issue that is not of 
public concern but, notwithstanding that holding, the court stated 
that “we find Gertz’s proposition that states have no interest in 
securing gratuitous awards far exceeding actual injury to be 
persuasive.”175 The court’s statement appears to question the 
validity of the presumed damages rule, but the court went no 
further in its consideration of the rule. The court’s conclusion, 
given the record in the case, was that the “$233,000 in general 
damages far exceeds the amount of past and future harm to 
appellant’s reputation, mental distress, humiliation, and 
embarrassment that would normally flow from a publication of this 
kind.”176 
 
 171.  Id. at 161. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 162–63 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 
(1974)). 
 174.  544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996). 
 175.  Longbehn, 727 N.W.2d at 163. 
 176.  Id. 
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The district court’s instructions on presumed damages and the 
court of appeals’ criticism of the instructions highlight the 
problems involved in conveying the presumed damages concept to 
a jury without requiring either a causal connection between the 
defamatory statement or proof of actual damages. Appellate courts 
face the same problem in reviewing those awards, as Longbehn II 
illustrated. 
A remand for a retrial on the general damages issue, with a 
nod to Gertz as a potential limitation on damages,177 did not provide 
the district court with guidelines for the retrial, other than 
suggesting that the damages awarded by the jury exceeded what 
would normally be expected from the defamatory communication 
by Schoenrock. The court of appeals did provide an apparent clue, 
however, when it stated that the record showed that Schoenrock 
“used the offensive nickname on one isolated occasion,” that there 
was no evidence that Schoenrock was responsible for initiating the 
use of the name, and that Longbehn was commonly known in the 
Moose Lake community by the derogatory nickname.178 
The district court, trying to limit presumed damages, and, not 
surprisingly, picking up on the court of appeals comments on the 
record, gave instructions tinged with actual damages requirements 
and special verdict questions that directed the jury to consider the 
damages caused by the statement “on the one isolated occasion.”179 
At trial after remand, the district court gave the following jury 
instructions on the defamation per se and damages issues: 
Defamation 
The use of the term “Pat the pedophile,” is 
defamation per se. A person is liable for the general harm 
which results from the defamatory statement. Your duty as a 
jury is to determine the amount of damages, if any, that 
the Plaintiff sustained by the Defendant’s use of that 
nickname. 
In making your decision the Court has determined as 
a matter of law that: 
1. The Defendant used the offensive nickname on one 
isolated occasion. 
 
 177.  The court of appeals had no authority to overrule Richie, of course. 
 178.  Longbehn, 727 N.W.2d at 160. 
 179.  Id.  
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2. At the time he did so the Plaintiff was commonly 
known in the Moose Lake community by this 
derogatory nickname. 
3. The Defendant’s use of the nickname was not a 
substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiff’s 
termination by the Moose Lake Police Department. 
4. The Defendant’s use of the nickname did not cause 
the Plaintiff any loss of perspective [sic] employment 
and cannot be viewed as the legal cause of any 
difficulty the Plaintiff may encounter in trying to 
obtain future employment. 
Presumed Damages 
Deciding harm for defamation 
The only question for you to decide is the amount of 
money the Plaintiff is entitled to receive for: 
1. Harm to his reputation and standing in the 
community 
2. Mental distress 
3. Humiliation 
4. Embarrassment 
No evidence of actual harm is required. 
In your assessment of general damages you may 
consider: (1) the character of the Plaintiff; (2) the 
Plaintiff’s general standing and reputation in the 
community; (3) the character of the defamatory public-
cation; (4) the extent of dissemination by the Defendant; 
and (5) the extent and duration of the circulation of the 
Defendant’s publication. 
Damages—Burden of Proof 
Definition of “burden of proof” 
A party asking for damages must prove the nature, 
extent, duration, and consequences of his harm. You must 
not decide damages based on speculation or guess.180 
 
 180.  Jury Instructions at 6, Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. 09-C5-01-681, 2009 
WL 2912575 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 27, 2009) (emphasis added). An additional issue 
not raised by the court of appeals concerns the burden of proof instruction, which 
also seems to be inconsistent with a presumed damages rule that in fact invites 
speculation on the part of a jury that is permitted to award damages without proof 
of those damages. 
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The district court instructed the jury that the term “Pat the 
Pedophile” was defamation per se followed by specific instructions 
built on the court of appeals’ observations that were intended to 
temper the jury’s discretion with respect to damages. The court 
told the jury that the defamatory term was used on only one 
isolated occasion; that the plaintiff was known by the name in the 
community; that the defendant’s use of the name was not a factor 
in his termination by the police department; and that the 
defendant’s use of the term did not cause the plaintiff any loss of 
prospective employment, nor was it the cause of any problems the 
plaintiff may have had in attempting to obtain future employment. 
The court also listed factors for the jury to consider in determining 
general damages. 
The court did state in its instructions that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover for harm to reputation, mental distress, 
humiliation, and embarrassment, and that the plaintiff did not 
have to prove actual harm in order to recover. In constraining the 
recoverable damages, the instructions required a finding of a causal 
link between the defamatory statement and the damages. The 
special verdict form did the same: 
1. Did the Plaintiff suffer harm to his reputation and 
standing in the community from the Defendant’s use of 
the defamatory nickname on the one isolated occasion? 
Answer: Yes              No X 
2. Did the Plaintiff suffer mental distress from the 
Defendant’s use of the defamatory nickname on the one 
isolated occasion? 
Answer: Yes              No X 
3. Did the Plaintiff suffer humiliation from the 
Defendant’s use of the defamatory nickname on the one 
isolated occasion? 
Answer: Yes              No X 
4. Did the Plaintiff suffer embarrassment from the 
Defendant’s use of the defamatory nickname on the one 
isolated occasion? 
Answer: Yes              No X 
[If your answers to any of the above were “Yes,” then 
answer Question 5.] 
40
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5. What amount of money will fairly and adequately 
compensate the Plaintiff for damages caused by the 
Defendant’s use of the defamatory nickname on the one 
isolated occasion: 
i) Harm to his reputation and standing in the 
community? 
ii) Mental distress 
iii)Humiliation 
iv) Embarrassment181 
The jury found that Longbehn did not suffer damages “from” the 
defendant’s use of the defamatory term. On appeal to the court of 
appeals for the third time, Longbehn argued, and the court of 
appeals agreed (Longbehn III), that the instructions and special 
verdict questions required proof of actual damages and a causal 
connection between those damages and the defamatory statement: 
The district court’s jury instructions are erroneous 
because . . . they required Longbehn to prove that he 
actually suffered harm because of Schoenrock’s defa-
matory statement. The interrogatories of the special-
verdict form are erroneous because they asked the jury 
whether Longbehn “suffer[ed]” harm “from the 
Defendant’s use of the defamatory nickname.” Accor-
dingly, the district court erred by denying Longbehn’s 
motion for a new trial on this ground. On remand, the 
district court shall revise its instructions. The district court 
also shall not include the first, second, third, and fourth 
interrogatories in its special-verdict form; rather, the 
special-verdict form shall include only interrogatory 
number 5 and its subparts.182 
That avoids the problems created by the first four 
interrogatories, but interrogatory number five asks what amount of 
damages will compensate the plaintiff for damages caused by the 
use of the defamatory term. The causal connection problem 
remains. It confines the inquiry by limiting it to the damages 
“caused” by the defendant’s use of the defamatory statement “on 
one isolated occasion.” The court of appeals, while criticizing the 
repeated use of the term “on one isolated occasion” in the first four 
 
 181.  Special Verdict Form at 1–2, Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. 09-C5-01-681, 
2009 WL 2912622 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 27, 2009). 
 182.  Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. A09–2141, 2010 WL 3000283, at *4 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010). 
41
Steenson: Presumed Damages in Defamation Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] PRESUMED DAMAGES FOR DEFAMATION 1533 
interrogatories, appeared to sanction its use in the single 
interrogatory that would be submitted on the damages issue. 
There were additional issues concerning the instructions that 
the court of appeals thought necessary to resolve because the case 
was being remanded for a new trial in the hopes of bringing the 
case to a conclusion. Longbehn argued that the district court erred 
in incorporating the following factual statements in its instructions 
to the jury: 
Your duty as a jury is to determine the amount of 
damages, if any, that the plaintiff sustained by the 
defendant’s use of that nickname. In making your 
decisions, the court has determined as a matter of law 
that, number one, the defendant used the offensive nickname 
on one isolated occasion. 
Number two, at the time he did so the plaintiff was 
commonly known in the Moose Lake community by this 
derogatory name. 
Number three, the defendant’s use of the nickname was not 
a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s termination 
by the Moose Lake Police Department. 
And number four, that the defendant’s use of the 
nickname did not cause the plaintiff any loss of prospective 
employment and cannot be viewed as a legal cause of any 
difficulty the plaintiff may encounter in trying to obtain future 
employment.183 
The factual statements were drawn from the court of appeals’ 
opinion in Longbehn II. 
Longbehn objected to the instructions, but the district court 
concluded that the instructions were appropriate as the law of the 
case. The court of appeals rejected that argument, concluding that 
the law of the case doctrine applies only to questions of law and not 
fact.184 The court explained that the factual statements in Longbehn 
II were intended to provide context for the court’s discussion of the 
legal issues that followed and “were not intended to reflect the 
resolution of legal issues.”185 The court of appeals held that “the 
 
 183.  Id. at *3 (emphasis by the court of appeals omitted and emphasis added 
by the author). 
 184.  Id. at *4. 
 185.  Id. at *5. 
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district court should not have relied on the law-of-the-case doctrine 
to constrain the jury’s factfinding role.”186 
The court also concluded that the district court erred in 
including the phrase, “on the one isolated occasion,” in the first 
four special verdict questions.187 While noting that district courts 
have discretion in drafting forms, the court of appeals saw no 
justification for including the phrase in the special verdict form. 
The court held that it was argumentative and tended to unfairly 
minimize Schoenrock’s conduct and its consequences.188 
The court in Longbehn III did not consider the Gertz issue raised 
in Longbehn II. Notwithstanding the concerns over the presumed 
damages rule expressed in the second court of appeals decision, 
the rule appears intact after Longbehn III. While the court’s opinion 
in Longbehn III was unpublished, the court of appeals did not limit 
the scope of the presumed damages rule to actual damages, which 
leaves the court of appeals’ published opinion in Longbehn II as 
raising a question about presumed damages, but nothing more. 
The evidentiary rulings by the court of appeals in Longbehn III 
indicate that the jury was not completely without guidance in 
evaluating Longbehn’s reputation in the case. The defendant 
introduced adverse evidence concerning the plaintiff’s reputation 
in the community.189 The plaintiff objected to the evidence, but the 
court of appeals held that the district court correctly allowed the 
evidence, finding that evidence of the plaintiff’s own existing 
reputation is highly relevant and central to the damages estimate.190 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id.  
 189.  There were three witnesses who testified to that effect: Sandy 
Schoenrock, Robin Schoenrock (the defendant), and Dale Heaton (the Moose 
Lake Chief of Police). Longbehn argued that the district court should have 
excluded the evidence because it was hearsay, lacked foundation, and was 
irrelevant. Id.  
 190.  Id. at *6 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 422, at 1190 (2000) 
(“‘The bad character of a plaintiff in a libel action may be shown in mitigation of 
damages’ by presenting evidence of the plaintiff’s ‘general reputation in that 
respect in the community in which he lives.’” (quoting Lydiard v. Daily News Co., 
110 Minn. 140, 145, 124 N.W. 985, 987 (1910))). The court also cited Krulic v. 
Petcoff, 122 Minn. 517, 520, 142 N.W. 897, 898 (1913) (“In actions for libel or 
slander, the term ‘character’ is used as meaning reputation; and in such an action 
the character of a plaintiff is determined by ascertaining the common repute of 
such plaintiff in the local community.”). As the court noted, Rule 405 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Evidence provided that if “evidence of character or a trait of 
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There is a distinction between the admissible evidence and the 
district court’s latitude in instructing the jury, however. In the 
fourth and final trial, the district court’s instructions on defamation 
read as follows: 
Defamation 
The use of the term “Pat the pedophile” is defamation 
per se. A person is liable for the general harm which 
results from the defamatory statement. Your duty as a jury 
is to determine the amount of money Plaintiff may receive 
for Defendant’s statement. 
Presumed General Damages 
Deciding harm for defamation 
The only question for you to decide is the amount of 
money the Plaintiff is entitled to receive for 
1. Harm to his reputation and standing in the 
community; 
2. Mental distress; 
3. Humiliation; and 
4. Embarrassment 
No evidence of actual harm is required. 
You may base the amount of money Plaintiff if entitled 
to receive on your assessment of the harm that would 
 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.” Id. (quoting MINN. R. 
EVID. 405(a)). There was sufficient foundation for the testimony because the 
witnesses had personal knowledge of the facts to which they were testifying, that is, 
Longbehn’s preexisting reputation in the community. Id. Citing Rule 602, the 
court of appeals concluded that it was unnecessary for the witnesses to “possess 
personal knowledge of the facts or reasons underlying that reputation.” Id. (citing 
MINN. R. EVID. 602). The court also held that the testimony was not hearsay. Id. 
Rule 803(21) includes an exception for hearsay evidence that concerns the 
“[r]eputation of a person’s character among associates or in the community.” 
MINN. R. EVID. 803(21). 
The court of appeals also held that the district court did not err in admitting 
a letter from the Department of Corrections to Longbehn stating why he was 
terminated from employment there. Longbehn, 2010 WL 3000283, at *6–7. The 
district court excluded Longbehn’s medical records, but the court of appeals held 
that the exclusion was not error because they were inconsistent with the purpose 
of general damages, and, in any event, Longbehn’s treating physician’s deposition 
was admitted and Longbehn was also permitted to testify about the reasons for his 
hospitalization. Id. 
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normally be assumed to flow from a defamatory 
publication of the nature involved here. 
In your assessment of presumed general damages you 
may consider: (1) the character of the Plaintiff; (2) the 
Plaintiff’s general standing and his reputation in the 
community; (3) the character of the defamatory public-
cation; (4) the extent of dissemination of the statement by 
the Defendant; and (5) the extent and duration of the 
circulation of the Defendant’s publication. 
There is no claim for lost wages or medical expenses 
and the above issue of presumed general damages is the 
only question before you.191 
This time the district court’s instructions eliminated any reference 
to the “one isolated occasion” language the court of appeals found 
objectionable in Longbehn III.192 There is no causation requirement 
in the instructions, other than the statement that the jury may 
award damages “for Defendant’s statement.”193 
The district court submitted the following special verdict form 
to the jury and the jury returned the form as follows: 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We, the Jury, having been duly impaneled and sworn, and 
having completed our deliberations, answer the Special 
Verdict interrogatories as follows: 
1. What amount of money will fairly and adequately 
compensate the Plaintiff for Defendant’s use of the 
defamatory nickname? 
a. Harm to Plaintiff’s reputation and standing in the 
community  $ 00.00 
b. Mental distress  $ 00.00 
c. Humiliation $ 750.00 
d. Embarrassment $ 00.00194 
The jury did not award damages for harm to the plaintiff’s 
reputation, mental distress, or embarrassment, but solely for 
 
 191.  Jury Instructions at 6, Longbehn, No. 09-C5-01-681. 
 192.  See id.; Longbehn, 2010 WL 3000283, at *3.  
 193.  Longbehn, 2010 WL 3000283, at *3.  
 194.  Special Verdict Form at 1, Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. 09-C5-01-681 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012).  
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“humiliation.”195 Based upon the special verdict form, the district 
court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $750.196 
The jury instructions in the fourth trial were informed by the 
restrictions imposed on the district court by the court of appeals in 
Longbehn II and III. The instructions told the jury that the use of the 
derogatory term was “defamation per se,” making the person who 
utters the statement liable for general damages.197 The jury was told 
that it could award damages for harm to reputation, mental 
distress, humiliation, and embarrassment, and that “no evidence of 
actual harm is required,” although the jury was also admonished 
that it should not base its answers to the special verdict questions 
on damages on speculation or guess.198 
The court used the same guidelines as in its previous set of 
instructions, instructing the jury that it could consider “the harm 
that would normally be assumed to flow from a defamatory 
publication of the nature involved here,” taking into consideration 
the plaintiff’s character, and general standing and reputation in 
the community, along with the character of the defamatory 
statement and the extent of the dissemination of the statement.199 
The reference to the “one isolated occasion” that was problematic 
for the court of appeals in the third appeal was excluded from the 
instructions.200 
There is no causation requirement in either the jury 
instructions or special verdict form. The special verdict form asked 
only “[w]hat amount of money will fairly and adequately 
compensate the Plaintiff for Defendant’s use of the defamatory 
nickname?”201 
 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Order at 1–2, Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. 09-C5-01-681 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. Oct. 12, 2012). 
 197.  Jury Instructions at 6, Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. 09-C5-01-681 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012). 
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. A09–2141, 2010 WL 3000283, at *5 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010). 
 201.  Special Verdict Form at 1, Longbehn v. Schoenrock, No. 09-C5-01-681 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012). 
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VII. LESSONS FROM LONGBEHN ? 
The problems raised in the Longbehn trials and appeals may 
seem unusual, given the time span of the case and the four trials it 
took to achieve a final resolution of the case, but given the rule of 
presumed damages, the problems are certainly not unique. The 
plaintiff attempted to prove actual damages in the case by 
connecting his employment and health problems to the use of a 
nickname he alleged was triggered by the defendant. The 
defendant attempted to limit the scope of the damages by 
introducing evidence that the plaintiff’s reputation suffered in the 
community. The district court in its instructions and special verdict 
forms tried to account for the presumed damages rule, but also to 
confine those damages within the boundaries of what damages 
might reasonably be expected to be arising out a single defamatory 
phone call. It was not an easy task. The district court inched toward 
the very general jury instructions and special verdict form given in 
the fourth trial, following two reviews by the court of appeals. 
The jury instructions given by the district court in the fourth 
trial eliminate anything that hints of a causation requirement. They 
are general in nature and not tied to the specific facts of the case. 
There was no appeal, but the instructions are consistent with the 
admonition of the court of appeals in the third appeal. 
The court of appeals decisions could be viewed as a vivid 
illustration of the problems associated with the presumed damages 
rule, or, perhaps, the case might be viewed as an aberration. It 
might be argued that any case that leads to three appeals, two of 
which involved the presumed damages issue, and four trials, 
demonstrates that the law simply cannot be applied fairly and 
consistently. A jury is told that it can award damages for injury to 
reputation and mental suffering, humiliation, and embarrassment, 
and that no actual proof of damages is required, but it cannot be 
told that the damages have to be caused by the defamatory 
statement. 
The district court in Longbehn was presented with a sweeping 
theory that would have held the defendant liable for an array of 
damages that were allegedly the consequence of the defendant’s 
use of the defamatory nickname because of the defendant’s 
“coining” of the name, which, as the argument ran, made him 
responsible for subsequent repetitions of the claim. Even though 
the court of appeals rejected that theory in Longbehn II, which 
seemed to narrow the issue to the damages that might be expected 
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to flow from the use of the nickname on “one isolated occasion,” 
attempting to confine the jury’s subsequent consideration of 
damages too narrowly ran afoul of the presumed damages rule as 
pointed out in Longbehn III. 
The district court’s dilemma was in crafting jury instructions 
and a special verdict form limiting damages to those that would be 
presumed to flow from a single defamatory statement, but without 
requiring a finding of actual causation, as would have been the case 
with an actual damages rule. Allowing damages beyond the single 
defamatory phone call sets any award up for a claim of 
excessiveness. If the damages award is substantial, a court is left 
with few tools to reduce it, as Longbehn II points out. 
On the other hand, it also seems clear that the plaintiff 
introduced evidence of actual damage and that the defendant 
introduced evidence that the plaintiff’s reputation was already 
impaired in the community. In that respect, Longbehn is no 
different from other litigated defamation cases in which plaintiffs 
will most commonly introduce evidence of actual emotional 
distress and defendants will attempt to limit the impact of that 
evidence, perhaps by showing limited publication or diminished 
reputation. 
Evaluating the series of trials and appeals in Longbehn can lead 
to different conclusions. The amount of time it took to resolve the 
case might be questioned, but the plaintiff was trying to establish a 
principle. And while the case did take time, the final set of jury 
instructions and special verdict form that were the product of the 
appeals in the case got the law right and should provide guidelines 
for submission of presumed damages issues to juries. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
At some point, the presumed damages rule will be directly 
reconsidered in Minnesota. When it is, the argument against 
retention of the rule will likely focus on the difficulty of either 
defining or constraining presumed damages, particularly in the 
face of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s repeated statements that 
the primary purpose of defamation law is to vindicate reputation. 
The argument might also have—as a minor premise—the problems 
in distinguishing between defamation per se and other defamatory 
statements by highlighting the inequities that result from allowing 
presumed damages in all categories of libel, but only certain 
categories of slander. Many of the defamation claims, including 
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libel claims, are based on the publication of defamatory statements 
that fall within the slander per se categories. Eliminating the 
distinctions, so that damages in either libel or slander cases would 
be presumed if one of the “per se” categories is established, would 
make it more difficult to recover because of the limitation. 
The argument against retention might also emphasize the fact 
that plaintiffs typically introduce evidence of actual harm to 
reputation and evidence of actual emotional distress, humiliation, 
and embarrassment, while defendants will introduce evidence to 
the contrary. The argument then is that an actual damages rule 
would simply conform to the actual practice in defamation cases. 
The argument in favor of retention of the rule might flip that 
argument and use the actual practice argument in favor of 
retention of the rule. If juries are given some factual guidance in 
most cases, the argument is that juries will have a factual basis for 
making a presumed damages award. In effect, the actual proof 
becomes an evidentiary constraint on the arbitrary application of 
the rule. 
The argument in favor of retention would also underscore the 
difficulty of proof of actual injury to reputation. Cases such as Richie 
show that difficulty. While the court of appeals in Richie thought 
that the breadth of the publication was significant enough to justify 
an inference of injury to reputation, the supreme court saw the 
same evidence as inadequate to establish actual harm to reputation. 
A presumed damages rule gives the plaintiff a greater degree of 
latitude in cases where the intuitive sense is that there is injury to 
reputation, but it may fall short of proof of actual harm to 
reputation. 
Given the ease of defaming another person through the social 
media, it is arguable that a remedy for defamation through 
presumed damages is more necessary now than ever, even if 
plaintiffs are not able to provide evidence of actual harm to 
reputation in a given case. 
There are also other alternatives short of a rejection of the 
presumed damages rule for injury to reputation. While injury to 
reputation may be difficult to prove, emotional harm may not be as 
difficult to establish. Plaintiffs typically introduce evidence of actual 
emotional harm, although the evidence falls short of what would be 
required in cases involving intentional or negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims. The Village of Isle case makes it clear that 
the physical injury requirement is inapplicable in cases involving 
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defamation claims.202 Requiring proof of emotional harm in 
presumed damages cases would fall short of extending Richie to all 
defamation cases, but it would limit speculation on a key element 
of damages under the existing rule. 
Minnesota practice and precedent will be critical in any 
determination of whether to retain, modify, or reject the rule. The 
experience of other jurisdictions could readily support arguments 
for retention or abolition.203 
The Minnesota experience shows that defamation cases are 
difficult to win. Most defamation claims are disposed of on 
summary judgment, before presumed damages become an issue.204 
Minnesota’s experience with the presumed damages rule does not 
seem to establish abuse of the rule in cases in which the issue is 
tried to a conclusion. 
The cumulative experience of the Longbehn cases provides an 
insight into how defamation law works in the trenches. It was a case 
of slander per se. The use of the nickname that led to the lawsuit 
was injurious, but ultimately not proven to be connected to the 
special damages sustained by the plaintiff. The general, presumed 
damages for injury to reputation and emotional harm, properly 
constrained by the district court’s instructions in the final case, 
were effectively constrained by the limited use of the nickname by 
the defendant. That is reflected in the jury’s findings in the fourth 
trial that no damages should be awarded for injury to reputation 
and only limited damages for “humiliation” for the use of the 
nickname. 
Longbehn is an example of the common law working itself out 
through the process of trial and appeal. The trials and appeals that 
preceded the fourth trial established the foundation for that result. 
The jury instructions and special verdict forms also provide 
guidelines for the trial of other “defamation per se” claims in 
Minnesota. The Minnesota presumed damages cases in general and 
the Longbehn series of decisions in particular show that the 
presumed damages rule is workable and can be properly 
 
 202.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 367–68, 
122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963). 
 203.  For a recent example, see Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 121–22 
(Minn. 2012) (holding that primary assumption of risk did not apply to 
snowmobiling accident and relying on settled Minnesota precedent as well as cases 
from other jurisdictions taking that position). 
 204.  See supra note 99. 
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constrained. The issue is whether other countervailing interests 
justify rejecting the rule, including a Richie-based assumption that 
there is no real interest in allowing anything other than damages 
for actual injury to reputation supported by defamation law. 
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